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The International Court of Justice and “non-universal” 
customary norms1 
La Corte Internacional de Justicia y las normas consuetudinarias “no-universales” 
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especialista en Derecho Internacional Público, Derecho Internacional de las Inversiones y Arbitraje 
Internacional. 
 
Abstract: The wording of Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice might 
imply that no other customs apart from the “universal” ones could be considered as sources of 
international law. However, the International Court of Justice took a proactive role and 
recognised the existence of “special” (i.e. local or regional) customary rules and perhaps 
employed a more creative approach and actually “read them” into Article 38(1) of the Statute. 
Moreover, the Court also seems to have created the “rules on how to ascertain the rules” of 
special custom, when it set a higher threshold for proving its establishment through its case-law 
in Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, Asylum, Nationals in Morocco and Right of Passage cases. The 2009 
Navigational and Related Rights case seems out of sync with the previous cases on special custom, 
and it remains to be seen whether it can be considered as more than anomaly in the Court’s 
jurisprudence. Even though the International Court of Justice seemingly had quite a proactive 
role with regards to special custom, it appears that it avoided to pronounce explicitly on some 
issues such as how to ascertain opinio juris or relation between general and special customary 
rules.  
Key words: International Court of Justice – Customary Rules – Special Custom. 
Resumen: La redacción del artículo 38 (1) del Estatuto de la Corte Internacional de Justicia quizá presupone 
que no otras costumbres, aparte de las “universales”, podrían ser consideradas como fuentes del derecho 
internacional. Sin embargo, la Corte tomó un papel proactivo y reconoció la existencia de las reglas de costumbre 
“especial” (es decir, local o regional), quizás empleando un enfoque más creativo y realmente las “leyó” en el 
artículo 38 (1) del Estatuto. Por otra parte, la Corte Internacional de Justicia también parece haber creado las 
“reglas sobre la manera de determinar las reglas” de costumbre especial, cuando fijó un umbral más alto para 
                                                          
1
  Artículo enviado el 05.10.2015 y aceptado el 13.12.2015. 
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acreditar su establecimiento a través de su jurisprudencia en Pesquerías Anglo-Noruegas, Asilo, 
Nacionales en Marruecos y Derecho de paso. El caso de Navegación y los derechos conexos, de 
2009, parece estar fuera de sintonía respecto a los casos anteriores sobre la costumbre especial, y debe aún verse si 
podría ser considerado como algo más que una anomalía en la jurisprudencia de la Corte. A pesar de que la Corte 
Internacional de Justicia aparentemente tenía un papel muy activo en materia de costumbre especial, parece que 
evitaba pronunciarse explícitamente sobre algunos temas, como la manera de determinación de opinio juris o la 
relación entre las normas consuetudinarias generales y especiales. 
Palabras clave: Corte Internacional de Justicia – reglas consuetudinarias – costumbre especial  
 
 
“Yet international law is a customary law system, despite all 
 the treaties; even the principle of pacta sunt servanda, the obligation  
to comply with the treaties, is a customary law obligation. If we cannot 
 explain custom, we might have to conclude that international law 
 as a whole is built on shaky normative foundations”2.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The primary role of any international court, International Court of Justice (ICJ or the Court) 
included, is to solve a dispute before it on the basis of law applicable between the litigants. 
Still, every now and then international lawyers debate about whether the Court, while resolving 
the dispute, in effect does more than just applying the rules of international law (IL), by going 
further and developing, or perhaps even creating, rules of IL or at least rules on how to 
ascertain the IL rules. Having in mind in particular that the formation and evidence of 
customary IL has finally been included in the IL Commission (ILC) agenda, time is proper for 
(re)engaging in discussions about customary IL and the role of the ICJ in its establishment, 
development or perhaps even creation, given the links between IL and customs as explained 
by Judge Crawford. This paper shall attempt to contribute to the debate by focusing on the 
role of the ICJ with regards to “non-universal”, i.e. special customary rules, in light of the 
terminology adopted here. The first section of the paper shall contain a brief overview of 
custom as source of IL, with the particular emphasis on the unsettled issues which arose in 
practice and which were stressed out by writers. Second section shall deal with the concept of 
“special custom” as compared with “general” or ‘universal’ customary law. Third section shall 
assess the case law of the ICJ concerning special customs and attempt to explain the method 
the Court used to ascertain the existence of this type of rules. In doing this, the article shall 
                                                          
2  CRAWFORD, James. Chance, Order, Change: The Course of International Law, General Course on Public International Law. Leiden, 
Brill, 2014, p. 49. 
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draw upon the approach used by Alberto Alvarez-Jimenez in 20113. The fourth section shall 
identify some questions regarding special custom which the ICJ left open, such as the manner 
of demonstrating opinio juris and the issue of hierarchy between special and general custom. 
Finally, I shall conclude by summing up the key findings of this article. 
 
2. Custom as a source of International Law 
 
Article 38(1) of the Statute of International Court of Justice4, which the majority of 
international lawyers consider as providing an authoritative list of sources of IL5, defines 
international custom6 as “evidence of a general practice accepted as law”. The two constitutive 
elements of international custom are commonly derived from this provision7: (1) state practice 
as an objective or material element of custom and (2) opinio juris sive necessitatis (“opinio juris”) as a 
subjective or psychological element that reflects the existence of a state’s belief that it is bound 
by a certain practice8 . 
Controversies regarding this source of IL are plenty, ranging from doubts about existence of 
this source to the type of evidence for establishing state practice and opinio juris. As their 
evaluation is beyond the scope of this paper, they shall only be briefly noted here for the 
purpose of shedding some light on the concept of custom, as, arguably, special custom could 
not exist without general custom.  
As noted above, some writers doubt that custom can even be considered a source of IL. 
Barberis believes that custom cannot be a source of law, because the procedure for its creation 
is not based upon law:  
                                                          
3  See generally: ALVAREZ-JIMENEZ, Alberto. “Methods for the Identification of Customary International Law in the 
International Court of Justice’s Jurisprudence: 2000-2009”. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2011, 60(3), pp. 681-
712. 
4  Statute of the ICJ, 26 June 1945. 
5  SHAW, Malcolm. International Law. 6th ed. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 70-71; CRAWFORD, James. Brownlie’s 
Principles of International Law. 8th ed. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 20; THIRLWAY, Hugh. “The Sources of 
International Law”. In EVANS, Malcolm D. (ed.), International Law. 3rd ed. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 113-
114; GEIGER, Rudolf H. “Customary International Law in the Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice: A 
Critical Appraisal”. In FASTENRATH, Ulrich et. al. (eds.). From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Bruno 
Simma. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 674. Contra: CANÇADO TRINDADE, Antônio Augusto. International Law for 
Humankind: Toward a New Ius Gentium. Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2010, pp. 114-115. 
6  Terms “custom”, “customary international law”, “customary rule” used throughout this text all have the same meaning 
and refer to ‘international custom’ as source of IL as provided by Article 38(1) of Statute of the ICJ. 
7  For the critique of the provision’s wording, see e.g. CRAWFORD, Chance…, op. cit., pp. 49-50. 
8  CRAWFORD, Principles…, op.cit., pp. 23-27. 
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“Les considérations qui précèdent permettent d'aboutir à la conclusion que les normes 
coutumières internationales ne sont crées par aucun procédé établi par voie de droit ou, en 
d'autres termes, que la coutume n'est pas  une source du droit des gens”9. 
He believes that state practice and opinio juris are only techniques for ‘recognizing the existence’ 
of a customary rule:  
 “Ce qu'il importe de souligner dans cette analyse, c'est que la pratique ou élément matériel 
et l’opinio juris ne font partie d'aucun procédé juridiquement établi dans le but de créer des 
normes coutumières, mais qu'il s'agit uniquement d'une technique permettant de 
reconnaître leur existence”10. 
A particularly heavy criticism of customary law as a source of IL can be found in Kelly’s 
seminal work, where the entire concept was called “meaningless”, for the following three 
reasons: 1) “the substantive CIL norms of the literature lack the authority of customary law 
and therefore are not binding on states” 2) custom is a poorly defined and undetermined 
source, which 3) lacks “procedural legitimacy”11. 
Some scholars, such as Estreicher, do not deny the existence of custom, but appear doubtful 
about its binding character in IL12. Others, who support “one-element theory” of custom, are 
of the opinion that one of the two constituent elements of customary IL is redundant.  For 
instance, Guzman and Cheng claim that custom is comprised only of opinio juris13. Interestingly, 
Guzman actually views state practice as evidence of opinio juris14 and states that “a rule of CIL 
exists if and only if opinio juris exists”15, which, when applied to special customary rules, in 
effect means that the stringent requirements for demonstrating such a rule are superfluous16. 
Famous Austrian positivist, Hans Kelsen, considered state practice a sufficient element for 
establishment of a customary international rule: 
“Cet auteur soutient que cette conception est fondée sur une erreur parce que ceux qui 
exercent la pratique doivent croire en l'existence d'une norme qui, en réalité, n'existe pas. 
S'agissant des aspects pratiques, Kelsen affirme que la preuve de opinio juris est quasiment 
                                                          
9  BARBERIS, Julio. “Réflexions sur le coutume internationale”. Annuaire Français de Droit International, 1990, 36, p. 17. 
10  BARBERIS, “Réflexions…”,  p. 20. 
11  KELLY, J. Patrick. “Twilight of Customary International Law”. Virginia Journal of International Law, 1999-2000, 40, pp. 453-
454. 
12  ESTREICHER, Samuel. “Rethinking the Binding Effects of Customary International Law”. Virginia Journal of International 
Law, 2003-2004, 44, p. 5.  
13  CHENG, Bin. “United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space.ʻInstant’ International Customary Law?”. Indian Journal of 
International Law, 1965, 5, pp. 35-40; GUZMAN, Andrew T., “Saving Customary International Law”. Michigan Journal of 
International Law, 2005, 27, pp. 124-125.  
14  GUZMAN, “Saving Customary…”, op.cit., p. 157. 
15  GUZMAN, “Saving Customary…”, op.cit., p. 160. 
16  GUZMAN, “Saving Customary…”, op.cit., p. 161. For overview of the requirements, see text to notes 52, 53 and 54. 
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impossible à établir et que, dans de nombreux cas, l'élément  psychologique ne joue aucun 
rôle dans la formation de la coutume”17. 
The citation also leads us to the dilemma which has pervaded customary IL and which has left 
international lawyers baffled for decades. Namely, Kelsen refers to a crucial paradox of custom 
– i.e. to the question of how one “deluded state” commenced the “chain of false beliefs” that 
certain practice initially supported by (false?) opinio juris of that state, which eventually led other 
states to accept such practice as binding, resulting in the formation of a rule of customary IL18. 
Scholars have tried to untangle the paradox mostly by denying the requirement of either of the 
elements of custom19 as noted above. Intriguingly, it seems that the original custom actually 
had only one element: state practice20, while opinio juris appears to be a comparatively recent 
development21. However, “one-element approach” has not found support in the jurisprudence 
of the ICJ.  
The Court’s has been in favour of “two-element theory” ever since Lotus case decided by its 
predecessor Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)22.   
In comparison with other international judicial and arbitral bodies, the Court seems to have 
had a crucial role in development of customary IL23. Overall, its jurisprudence has so far shed 
light on many dilemmas concerning this source of IL, but, to be fair, has also created some 
new ones. A few are in turn briefly assessed below: attributes or ‘qualities’ of each element of 
custom, evidencing opinio juris and methodology for identification of norms of customary IL.  
As regards the attributes that each element of custom should have, several conclusions can be 
drawn. Crawford generally concluded that state practice should have certain duration, 
consistency and generality24. The Court has assessed these attributes in the seminal North Sea 
Continental Shelf case as follows: 
 “Although the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar 
to the formation of a new rule of customary IL on the basis of what was 
originally a purely conventional rule, an indispensable requirement would be 
that within the period in question, short though it might be, State practice, 
including that of States whose interests are specially affected, should have 
been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked; 
                                                          
17  KELSEN, Hans. “Théorie du droit international coutumier”. Revue Internationale, 1939, p. 263, cited in BARBERIS, 
“Réflexions…”, op.cit., p. 27. 
18  CRAWFORD, Chance…, op. cit., p. 56. Thirlway explains the paradox as “a case of communis error facit jus (a shared mistake 
produces law)”, THIRLWAY, “The Sources of…”, op.cit., pp. 102-103  
19  THIRLWAY, “The Sources of…”, op.cit., p. 103. 
20  CRAWFORD, Chance…, op. cit., p.53. 
21  Franz von Litzt may be the “founding father” of concept of opinio juris. See also STERN, Brigitte. “Custom at the Heart of 
International Law”. Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, 2011, 11, p. 95  
22  PCIJ (1927). The Case of the SS Lotus (France v. Turkey) (Merits). 
23  See similarly: ALVAREZ-JIMENEZ, “Methods for the Identification…”, op.cit., p. 683. 
24  CRAWFORD, Principles…, op.cit., pp. 24-25. 
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and should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a 
rule of law or legal obligation is involved”25. 
The most confusing part of this passage seems to be the last one, which may indicate that the 
ICJ requires state practice to in itself demonstrate the existence of opinio juris. 
Then, in Nicaragua the Court said that the state practice does not have to be “in absolute 
rigorous conformity with the rule”, clarifying that the possible occurrence of an inconsistency 
rather signals a breach of the rule than the formation of a new rule26. This might signal a 
departure from “virtually uniform” stance expressed in North Sea Continental Shelf.  But, at least 
it appears undisputed that the generality of practice does not have to be absolute. This could 
indicate that, at least in theory, universal customary rules other than the rules of jus cogens, do 
not exist as there could be at least one state which could object to a customary rule. 
State practice does not have to be long-lasting, since, e.g. customs related to outer space and 
continental shelf have developed over a relatively short period of time27. However, the Court 
implicitly refused to acknowledge the so called “instant customs”, extrapolated from the 
General Assembly (GA) resolutions, concluding that they are evidence of opinio juris, but not at 
the same time evidence of state practice28.  
The Court touched upon another possible problem related to state practice in Nuclear Weapons 
advisory opinion, but eventually provided no answer to it: namely, is the practice of the 
“specially affected states”, i.e. states possessing nuclear weapons, “more significant” then the 
practice of others?29 
An important issue which kept puzzling the Court seems to be evidencing the existence of 
opinio juris. Thirlway considers that the subjective element is deduced mainly ‘(…) from a 
general practice, from scholarly consensus or from its [the Court’s] own or other tribunals’ 
previous determinations’30. To this one could add the GA resolutions, as in Nicaragua and 
Nuclear Weapons31. Lotus case set an even higher threshold, indicating that each state’s belief in a 
binding character of a rule needs to be proven: 
                                                          
25  ICJ (1969). North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/The Netherlands; Federal Republic of 
Germany/Denmark) (Merits) (emphasis added). 
26  ICJ (1986). Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits). 
27  CRAWFORD, Principles…, op.cit., p. 24. The Court stated in North Sea Continental Shelf that, as long as the state practice related 
to continental shelf was ‘consistent’ and ‘virtually uniform’, the short passage of time is not a bar to formation of the 
customary rule (North Sea Continental Shelf , p. 43). 
28  Thirlway gives the examples of Nicaragua and Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons cases in support of this view. See 
THIRLWAY, “The Sources of…”, op.cit., p. 104. 
29  THIRLWAY, “The Sources of…”, op.cit., p. 104. 
30  CRAWFORD, Principles…, op.cit., p. 26 and fn 33. 
31  ICJ (1986). Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits); ICJ 
(1996). Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion. 
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“(…) for only if such abstention were based on their being conscious of 
having a duty to abstain would it be possible to speak of an international 
custom”32. 
In North Sea Continental Shelf, the Court similarly did not extract opinio juris from the state 
practice ascertained in 1958 or even subsequent practice, but expressly required “a general 
recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved”33. Crawford makes an interesting 
observation concerning opinio juris: the Court seems to consider primarily “the state of law” 
regarding the disputed issue. If it is covered by a treaty, opinio juris suffices to “expand 
application of the treaty norms as custom”, but if there is not - the Court’s discretion might 
play the main role34. 
Scholars have attempted to uncover the method whereby the ICJ ascertains customary IL. 
Alvarez-Jimenez seems to have been particularly successful in that enterprise, although his 
research encompassed only the Court’s jurisprudence during the first decade of this century.  
He identified two key methods or approaches whereby the Court seems to ascertain norms of 
“universal” customary IL: “the strict inductive method” and “flexible deductive approach”35. 
The first method is characterised by “bottom-up” approach, whereby the Court begins 
ascertaining custom by assessing the quality and quantity of state practice and then turns to 
finding support for such practice in opinio juris. It was conceived in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf case, and subsequently employed in recent cases such as Romania/Ukraine, Diallo, Arrest 
Warrant and Germany v. Italy36. Conversely, “flexible deductive approach” is essentially “top-
down”, as the ICJ begins by ascertaining opinio juris through GA resolutions and only then 
turns to assessment of state practice. The approach was cradled in Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua, and was also in essence employed in Nuclear Weapons Advisory 
Opinion37. 
Furthermore, Alvarez-Jimenez also pinpointed two “non-traditional” approaches concerning 
method of ascertaining customary IL in the Court’s jurisprudence38. The first one is “reliance 
on judicial decisions” as a method for determining customary IL (as in Wall, where the Court 
used the reasoning employed in South West Africa, Western Sahara and East Timor so as to 
determine the existence of right to self-determination; also in Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial 
Guinea Intervening, where the Court used its earlier jurisprudence and arbitral awards on 
                                                          
32  PCIJ (1927). The Case of the SS Lotus (France v. Turkey) (Merits). 
33  ICJ (1969). North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/The Netherlands; Federal Republic of 
Germany/Denmark) (Merits). 
34  CRAWFORD, Principles…, op.cit., p. 27. 
35  ALVAREZ-JIMENEZ, “Methods for the Identification…”, op.cit., pp. 3-4. 
36  ALVAREZ-JIMENEZ, “Methods for the Identification…”, op.cit., pp. 4, 7-9. 
37  ALVAREZ-JIMENEZ, “Methods for the Identification…”, op.cit., pp. 3-4. 
38  Milisavljević/Čučković, who in essence consider that the ICJ used “identification without evidence” and “identification 
through evidence” to ascertain the existence of the rules of customary international law; add another possible approach, 
which the Court seems to have employed in Gabčikovo/Nagymaros case when assessing the criteria for the state of necessity 
in international law, by “simply pointing to the position taken by the ILC as regards customary character of a rule in 
question”; see MILISAVLJEVIĆ, Bojan and ČUČKOVIĆ, Bojana. “Identification of Custom in International Law”. Annals of the 
Faculty of Law -Belgrade Law Review, 2014, 56(3), p. 46.  
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maritime delimitation to demonstrate the non-existence of customary rule whereby oil 
concessions represent relevant circumstance for delimitation purposes)39. The second “non-
traditional” approach involved “implicit recognition of customary rules” (i.e. actually applying 
the rules as if they were customary, but without an explicit pronunciation on their customary 
character), as in Bahrain/Qatar case40. This approach shall be relied on further in the article, as 
the Court’s jurisprudence on special customary rules can also be divided into two main groups 
identified by Alvarez-Jimenez.  
Another possible approach that deserves acknowledgment is Geiger’s. Noting that the Court 
often does not end up following the methodology it preaches41, Geiger explains that the Court 
follows two distinct approaches in determining the rules of customary IL, depending on the 
type of problem at hand. Namely, when the problem concerns basic norms of IL (e.g. 
prohibition of the use of force, principle of non-intervention, minimum considerations of 
humanity, sovereign immunity, pacta sunt servanda etc.) the standard of proof is seemingly lower 
than in situations when the Court is faced with the dilemma whether a more particular norm 
represents customary IL42.  
This also seems like a useful basic remark for assessment of the Court’s role with regards to 
special customary rules – essentially, the more specific a rule is, the higher should be a standard 
for identifying it.  
 
3. General and special customary rules 
 
The Court had a particularly important role in recognition of the existence of “non-universal” 
customary rules, as proposed in 1936 by Professor Basdevant43. Basically, Article 38 (1) of the 
ICJ Statute prima facie does not suggest that there is any other type of international custom 
other than the one that is “evidence of general practice accepted as law”. The wording implies 
that there exist no other customs apart from the “general” ones, applicable solely to the 
international community as a whole, but not to some of its parts. Another possible argument 
in favour of this interpretation could be that the ICJ Statute, unlike with treaties, omits to 
                                                          
39  ALVAREZ-JIMENEZ, “Methods for the Identification…”, op.cit., pp. 10-11. 
40  ALVAREZ-JIMENEZ, “Methods for the Identification…”, op.cit., pp. 11-12. 
41  GEIGER, “Customary International Law... ”, op.cit., p. 692. 
42  GEIGER, “Customary International Law... ”, op.cit., pp. 692-695. 
43  D’AMATO, Anthony.  “The Concept of Special Custom in International Law”. American Journal of International Law, 1969, 
63, p. 217. Professor Basdevant then referred to Article 38 of the Statute of the PCIJ, which is in essence the same as the 
statute of its successor. See CRAWFORD, Principles…, op.cit., pp. 21-22. 
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provide the possibility that the states could be bound by customs that are evidence of a more 
particular practice44.  
But, the two types of custom are rooted in the legal history of common law. D’Amato traces 
the distinction between general and special customary law to “Roman law and English 
common law”45. When it comes to the latter, “Blackstone summed up the historic distinction 
between the two types of custom: general customs, which are the universal rule of the whole 
kingdom, and form the common law...[and] particular customs, which, for the most part, affect 
only the inhabitants of particular districts”46. “England” replaced with “world”, and 
Blackstone’s definition could be used for general and special customs.  
Some terminological perplexities should also be resolved. Perhaps the most convenient and the 
least confusing solution is to name “non-universal” customary norms “special”, as suggested 
by D’Amato47. The reason for this is that other terms (local custom, regional custom, etc.) 
could cause uncertainty concerning the scope of application and number of states bound. On 
one hand, the notion “local custom” is manifold: it could imply that certain rule exists only 
within one country (i.e. England), or that it binds two countries within the same or different 
region or even several countries belonging to the same region. “Regional custom” could 
similarly mean different things: that it is a rule which binds states of one continent (e.g. asylum 
rules of Latin America), but also states belonging to a specific organisation within the 
continent (e.g. European Union, Organisation of American States). On the other hand, notion 
“special custom” does not cause such a problem, as it encapsulates all these varieties, while at 
the same time allowing for further sub-classifications. More importantly, the conditions 
required for identifying any possible type of special customary rule are the same, as explained 
in the following section.  
It is also conceivable that a “non-universal” customary norm evolves over time into a general 
one48. But, Tunkin claims that there are no customary rules by which all countries in the world 
are bound, as he believes that the fact that a significant number of states accept a rule as 
customary is no more than ‘assumption’ that a rule has achieved the status of general custom49. 
While this reasoning may seem attractive at the first sight, it squarely fits with jus cogens norms, 
which some writers regard as customary50, despite the lack of explicit confirmation of that 
status in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties51. However, Crawford 
                                                          
44  COHEN-JONATHAN, Gérard. “La coutume locale”. Annuaire Français de Droit International, 1961, pp. 120, 122 and authors 
cited there. 
45  D’AMATO, “The Concept of Special Custom…”, op.cit., p. 213. 
46  D’AMATO, “The Concept of Special Custom…”, op.cit., pp. 213-214. 
47  D’AMATO, “The Concept of Special Custom…”, op.cit., p. 213. Another possible (and correct) solution is to use the term 
‘particular custom’ as defined by International Law Association (ILA). See: ILA (2000). Final Report of the Committee: 
Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law, p. 64.  
48  TUNKIN, Grigory. “Remarks on Juridical Nature of Customary Norms of International Law”. California Journal of 
International Law, 1961, 49(3), p.425. 
49  TUNKIN, “Remarks on Juridical Nature…”, pp. 428-429. 
50  CRAWFORD, Principles…, op.cit., p.594. 
51  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969. 
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notices that, if “opinio juris requires states to consent individually to customary rules”, that 
would result in prevalence of “bilateral customary rule”’ (i.e. special customary rules) in public 
IL, where “universal is exceptional”52. Whether this is so or not is a question which goes 
beyond the scope of this paper, but the argument here is that the opinio juris does require states 
to explicitly or tacitly consent individually to a special customary rule or, at least, the ICJ has 
thus concluded in the majority of cases in which it dealt with special custom. 
 
4. Special Custom before the International Court of Justice 
 
4.1. 1950s and 1960s: a relatively settled jurisprudence 
The Court dealt with the “non-universal” customs for the first time in the Asylum case53. The 
case is of paramount importance, because the ICJ had not only recognised the status of special 
customs as sources of IL (and perhaps creatively ‘read them’ into Article 38 of the Statute), but 
also developed customary IL by establishing the conditions for their identification, which have 
been, at least until recently, fairly consistently used in similar situations in Court’s 
jurisprudence. 
Colombia argued that there had been a rule of regional customary law specific for Latin 
America, which allows the state granting asylum (“state of refuge”) to unilaterally determine 
the nature of a criminal offence (military or ordinary crime) committed by an asylum seeker 
and to bind the home state (Peru) by such determination54. Although it denied Colombia’s 
claim, the Court for the first time acknowledged a theoretical possibility that “non-universal” 
customary norms could exist. Moreover, the Court set a higher threshold for establishing these 
norms by listing four elements which need to be satisfied for the identification of a special 
custom. The first three of them include proving the existence of “standard” opinio juris and 
state practice elements, and shifting a burden of proof for evidencing custom to the claimant 
state55. This is substantially different from reasoning of the ICJ concerning general customary 
law, where it has been guided by principle jura novit curia, so that the Court, not a party, 
identified and evidenced custom56. The fourth and final condition for the existence of a non-
universal customary rule is that the state that is claimed to be bound by it has not explicitly or 
tacitly objected to the alleged rule57. 
                                                          
52  CRAWFORD, Chance…, op.cit., pp. 56-57. For an analysis on “’[h]ow much opinio juris is required” in terms of quantity to 
establish a customary norm, see ibid., pp. 56-61. 
53  ICJ (1950). Colombian-Peruvian Asylum case (Colombia v Peru) (Merits). 
54  ICJ (1950). Colombian-Peruvian Asylum case (Colombia v Peru) (Merits). 
55  See similarly BARBERIS, “Réflexions…”, op.cit., p. 39. 
56  ICJ (1950). Colombian-Peruvian Asylum case; CASSESE, Antonio. International Law. 2nd ed. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2005, p.164. 
57  ICJ (1950). Colombian-Peruvian Asylum case; COHEN-JONATHAN, “La coutume locale”, op.cit., pp. 132-133. 
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The relevant passages from the judgment in Asylum are as follows: 
“The Party which relies on a custom of this kind must prove that this 
custom is established in such a manner that it has become binding on the 
other Party. The Colombian Government must prove that the rule invoked 
by it is in accordance with a constant and uniform usage practised by the 
States in question, and that this usage is the expression of a right 
appertaining to the State granting asylum and a duty incumbent on the 
territorial State. This follows from Article 38 of the Statute of the Court, 
which refers to international custom “as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law”58. 
The facts brought to the knowledge of the Court disclose so much 
uncertainty and contradiction, so much fluctuation and discrepancy in the 
exercise of diplomatic asylum and in the official views expressed on various 
occasions, there has been so much inconsistency in the rapid succession of 
conventions on asylum, ratified by some States and rejected by others, and 
the practice has been so much influenced by considerations of political 
expediency in the various cases, that it is not possible to discern in all this 
any constant and uniform usage, accepted as law, with regard to the alleged 
rule of unilateral and definitive qualification of the offence59. 
The Court cannot therefore find that the Colombian Government has 
proved the existence of such a custom. But even if it could be supposed that 
such a custom existed between certain Latin-American States only, it could 
not be invoked against Peru which, far from having by its attitude adhered to 
it, has, on the contrary, repudiated it by refraining from ratifying the 
Montevideo Conventions of 1933 and 1939, which were the first to include a 
rule concerning the qualification of the offence in matters of diplomatic 
asylum”60. 
Јudge Alejandro Alvarez appended a dissenting opinion to the judgment, in which he 
supported the view that, although there existed Latin American IL as a special regional system 
within general IL, there was no customary Latin American IL on asylum, apart from “certain 
practices or methods in applying asylum which are followed by the states of Latin America”61. 
While admitting that one of such “practices or methods” was the right of of the state of refuge 
to decide on the character of crime commited by the asylum seeker, Judge Alvarez stopped 
short of conflating it with the rule of a regional, local or, in accordance with terminology 
adopted here, special custom. Judge Alvarez also omitted to address the possible consequences 
of the majority’s view that Peru objected to such practices, probably because he was of the 
                                                          
58  ICJ (1950). Colombian-Peruvian Asylum case. 
59  ICJ (1950). Colombian-Peruvian Asylum case. 
60  ICJ (1950). Colombian-Peruvian Asylum case. 
61  ICJ (1950). Colombian-Peruvian Asylum case (Colombia v Peru) (Dissenting Opinion by Judge Alvarez). 
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opinion that the right of the state of refuge to decide on the character of the crime was not 
absolute62. 
The following dispute in which the Court dealt with ‘non-universal’ customs, albeit implicitly, 
was Fisheries case63. United Kingdom asserted that the baselines determined by a Norwegian 
royal decree were contrary to the established norm of customary IL for drawing the baselines64. 
The claim was not upheld by the Court on the basis that, even if there existed such a rule, 
Norway had never conformed to it, while other countries “had acquiesced in this [Norwegian] 
practice”65. However, since the Court adjudged that the rule had not, according to state 
practice of the time, belonged to the corpus of general international norms66, some authors 
claimed that the rule could have been considered a local custom67. In addition, the Court 
perhaps could have declared straight baselines method, as employed by Norway, a special 
customary rule:  
“The notoriety of the facts, the general toleration of the international 
community, Great Britain’s position in the North Sea, her own interest in 
the question, and her prolonged abstention would in any case warrant 
Norway's enforcement of her system against the United Kingdom.  
The Court is thus led to conclude that the method of straight lines, 
established in the Norwegian system, was imposed by the peculiar geography 
of the Norwegian coast; that even before the dispute arose, this method had 
been consolidated by a constant and sufficiently long practice, in the face of which the 
attitude of governments bears witness to the fact that they did not consider it to be contrary 
to international law”68. 
Dissenting opinions refer to an interesting point, namely a possible requirement that practice 
forming a special customary rule is “publicised” or “made known” to interested state(s). Thus, 
Judge Read was of the view that, while Norway’s position was contrary to “customary 
international law” in the first place69, its potential “special status” could not have been 
acknowledged as it failed to make its position on “straight baselines” known to United 
Kingdom and thus prevented it from protesting70. Sir Arnold McNair, also dissenting, seems to 
share the same position with regards to “publicity” of a special regime of IL towards interested 
                                                          
62  ICJ (1950). Colombian-Peruvian Asylum case (Colombia v Peru) (Dissenting Opinion by Judge Alvarez), 297. 
63  ICJ (1951). Fisheries case (United Kingdom v Norway) (Merits). 
64  THIRLWAY, “The Sources of…”, op.cit., p. 107. 
65  CRAWFORD, Principles…, op.cit., p.29. 
66  ICJ (1951). Fisheries case (United Kingdom v Norway) (Merits). For a comprehensive critique of the outcome and the 
Court’s reasoning, see article by Professor Humphrey Waldock, Counsel for the United Kingdom in the case: WALDOCK, 
Humphrey. “The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case”. British Yearbook of International Law, 1951, 28, p. 114. 
67  COHEN-JONATHAN, “La coutume locale”, op.cit., p. 131. The Court, however, failed short of attributing such character to 
the ‘straight baselines rule’. D’Amato expressed the opinion that the notion of “historic waters” could have been 
considered a type of special custom. D’AMATO, “The Concept of Special Custom…”, op.cit., p. 219. 
68  ICJ (1951). Fisheries case (United Kingdom v Norway) (Merits). (emphasis added). 
69  ICJ (1951). Fisheries case (United Kingdom v. Norway) (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Read). 
70  ICJ (1951). Fisheries case (United Kingdom v. Norway) (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Read).  
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states71. The Court appears to have stopped short of expressly requesting the “publicity” of the 
special regime, but still hinted that the issue is not without importance when it took pains to 
demonstrate Norway’s regime was known to United Kingdom72. 
The ICJ has continued the line reasoning about the evidence of special customary rules of the 
Asylum case in Nationals in Morocco case73. Although the United States failed to demonstrate that 
its extraterritorial consular jurisdiction could have been established on the basis of a local 
custom, the Court again confirmed a theoretical possibility for the existence of such a norm74. 
Finally, the Court upheld the claim on existence of a special customary rule in the Right of 
Passage case75. Portugal succeeded in persuading the Court that there existed a right of passage 
for private persons, civil servants and goods between littoral territory and the two enclaves on 
Indian territory; but failed to prove the existence of such right related to the transport of arms 
and ammunition76. Significantly, the Court upheld Portugal’s argument that local custom can 
exist between only two states:  
“With regard to Portugal's claim of a right of passage as formulated by it on 
the basis of local custom, it is objected on behalf of India that no local 
custom could be established between only two States. It is difficult to see 
why the number of States between which a local custom may be established 
on the basis of long practice must necessarily be larger than two. The Court 
sees no reason why long continued practice between two States accepted by 
them as regulating their relations should not form the basis of mutual rights 
and obligations between the two States”77. 
However, Kelly considers that the ICJ showed some inconsistency in reasoning concerning the 
existence of special customary IL, quoting the following passage from the North Sea Continental 
Shelf case: 
“In the case of general or customary law rules and obligations... by their very 
nature, must have equal force for all members of the international 
community, and cannot therefore be the subject of any right of unilateral exclusion 
exercisable at will by any one of them in its own favour”78. 
The ICJ seems to have quite clearly established the criteria for ascertaining a special customary 
rule during the 1950s and 1960s. In general, they appear to be more stringent when compared 
to criteria needed for establishing such general custom. Thus, practice forming a special 
customary rule should be “constant and uniform”, and accepted as law by the opposing state. 
                                                          
71  ICJ (1951). Fisheries case (United Kingdom v. Norway) (Dissenting Opinion of Sir Arnold McNair). 
72  ICJ (1951). Fisheries case (United Kingdom v. Norway). 
73  ICJ (1952). Nationals in Morocco case (France v. United States). 
74  COHEN-JONATHAN, “La coutume locale”, op.cit., p. 131. 
75  ICJ (1960). Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India). 
76  ICJ (1960). Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India). 
77  ICJ (1960). Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India). 
78  KELLY, “Twilight…”, op.cit., pp. 512, fn 270 (emphasis added). 
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The burden of proof for demonstrating a special custom is shifted from the Court to the 
claimant state. Also, the opposing state should not object to such practice, although the way in 
which the lack of opposition should manifest is not entirely clear79. Also, the meticulous 
inductive manner in which the Court assessed the issue of special customs in cases presented 
above seems to correspond to “strict inductive approach” as identified by Alvarez Jimenez, or 
“bottom up” method for establishing custom. 
 
4.2. Late 2000s: the beginning of a new era?  
The Court has not dealt again with the issues concerning special customs until late 2000s. It 
seems that its fairly consistent “bottom up” approach was reversed in 2009 Navigational and 
Related Rights case which dealt with the existence of what is in essence a special customary right 
of Costa Rica to subsistence fishing from the bank of the San Juan river80. The most relevant 
passage from the judgment is the following: 
“The Parties agree that the practice of subsistence fishing is long established. 
They disagree however whether the practice has become binding on 
Nicaragua thereby entitling the riparians as a matter of customary right to 
engage in subsistence fishing from the bank. The Court observes that the 
practice, by its very nature, especially given the remoteness of the area and 
the small, thinly spread population, is not likely to be documented in any 
formal way in any official record. For the Court, the failure of Nicaragua to deny the 
existence of a right arising from the practice which had continued undisturbed and 
unquestioned over a long period is particularly significant. The Court accordingly concludes 
that Costa Rica has a customary right”81. 
Even if, given the specific circumstances of the case, one agrees with the view in which the 
Court treated the scarcity and lack of formal evidence of a long-lasting practice of subsistence 
fishing, the same hardly seems to be the case when the remaining three elements for 
demonstrating a special customary rule are concerned. Essentially, it appears that the ICJ has 
established a special customary rule solely on the basis of scarce practice and lack of protest on 
the side of Nicaragua, which does not seem to fit well with the line of reasoning conceived in 
Asylum case and in essence continued in Fisheries, Nationals in Morocco and Right of Passage cases. 
Remark of the Court with regards to “particularly significant” failure of Nicaragua to deny the 
existence of a special custom may imply that the Court established the right by relying mostly 
on abstention as evidence of opinio juris, is particularly striking. Reliance on the (inadequately 
justified?) opinio juris, accompanied by a brief reference to state practice may resemble “top 
                                                          
79  See below text to notes 85 and 86. 
80  ALVAREZ-JIMENEZ, “Methods for the Identification…”, op.cit., p. 15. 
81  ICJ (2009). Case Concerning the Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) (emphasis added). 
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down” or “flexible deductive approach” for identifying customary rule as envisaged by 
Alvarez-Jimenez.  
The reasoning of the majority was subject to criticism within the Court. While agreeing that 
Costa Rica has a customary right to subsistence fishing from the bank of the river, Judge ad hoc 
Gilbert Guillaume did so only because of the “special circumstances described by the Court”, 
while expressly declining the “precedential value” of the judgment in that regard82. Judge 
Sepúlveda-Amor was the only one who dissented from the majority on this issue, as he 
considered that the Court failed to follow its established jurisprudence on “nature and 
substance of customary IL”83. Indeed, his opinion in this regard is to be preferred. Lathtrop 
agrees and states that the alternative argument for Costa Rica as proposed by Judge Sepúlveda-
Amor (reliance on “acquired or vested rights”) was more in line with the established reasoning 
of the Court84.  
 
5. Open Questions  
 
Crawford noticed a particular problem with the subjective element of a special customary rule, 
namely how “opinio juris merges into acquiescence”85. The blur between the two institutes 
makes the establishment of a special customary rule more difficult in some circumstances, and 
it seems that the ICJ has not at all times been successful in making the distinction. To be fair 
on the Court, at times it can be indeed unclear whether the lack of reaction of a state 
concerned equals approval of a certain practice or simply unawareness of a special custom in 
statu nascendi. This was the case particularly in Navigational and Related Rights, where the Court 
has deduced opinio juris perhaps in a similar way to Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, essentially 
conflating “tolerance” of a certain practice with opinio juris. Often, the issue occurs when it is 
necessary to interpret abstention (or tolerance), which that could indicate “either tacit 
agreement or a simple lack of interest” towards a certain practice from the actual protest86.  
Another important issue does not seem to have been resolved by the Court yet - namely, the 
question of the hierarchy between general and special customary rules, and consequently 
whether the lex specialis derogit legi generali rule could apply. It seems that the only clear-cut 
                                                          
82  ICJ (2009). Case Concerning the Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) (Declaration of Judge 
ad hoc Guillaume). 
83  ICJ (2009). Case Concerning the Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) (Separate Opinion of 
Judge Sepúlveda-Amor). 
84  LATHROP, Coalter G. “Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)”. American Journal of 
International Law, 2010, 104, pp. 460-461. This choice would have also been in the interest of the affected local populations 
(which may have been the reason why the ICJ identified the existence of a customary right to subsistence fishing). For this 
point I remain grateful to Professor Ben Chigara of Brunel University. 
85  CRAWFORD, Principles…, op.cit., p. 30 and authors cited there.  
86  CRAWFORD, Principles…, op.cit., p. 25. 
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situation occurs when a special customary rule is juxtaposed to a jus cogens norm, when of 
course the latter prevails87. In remaining actual and hypothetical situations, the answer to the 
dilemma is not that simple. 
The problem arose in the Asylum case. As already noted, the Court then established the stricter 
criteria for ascertaining the special (regional) customary rule, but at the same time held the 
following: 
“(…) what the Court saw as systematic elements of general IL (sovereignty, non-
intervention, the regular enforcement of national law even against political 
offenders) overwhelmed considerations of regional custom or practice. And since the 
body of Latin American practice is the most sophisticated and generalized of 
the systems of regional custom in the modern era, one is inclined to say of 
the rest of the world – a fortiori”88. 
The ICJ also ruled on the matter in the Right of Passage case, reasoning as follows: 
“Having arrived at the conclusion that the course of dealings between the 
British and Indian authorities on the one hand and the Portuguese on the 
other established a practice, well understood between the Parties, by virtue 
of which Portugal had acquired a right of passage in respect of private 
persons, civil officials and goods in general, the Court does not consider it necessary 
to examine whether general international custom or the general principles of law recognized 
by civilized nations may lead to the same result89. 
The Court is here dealing with a concrete case having special features...Where 
therefore the Court finds a practice clearly established between two States 
which was accepted by the Parties as governing the relations between them, 
the Court must attribute decisive effect to that practice for the purpose of 
determining their specific rights and obligations. Such a particular practice must 
prevail over any general rules”90. 
As far as Asylum is concerned, prima facie it seems that the Court gave preference to general 
norms of IL, albeit those which are not specifically related to diplomatic asylum. Furthermore, 
it should be noted that the Court has not ruled out the existence of a special, region-specific 
rule on grating asylum, but held that the existence of such a rule was not proven.  
It could be argued that the Court in the Right of Passage actually gave explicit preference to a 
special (in this case, local) custom over a general rule. Conversely, it should also be noted that a 
general customary rule regulating the right of passage between land territory and enclaves did 
                                                          
87  COHEN-JONATHAN, “La coutume locale”, op.cit., p. 139 and authors cited there. 
88  CRAWFORD, James. “Univeralism and Regionalism from the Perspective of the Work of the International Law 
Commission”. In: CRAWFORD, James (ed.) International Law as an Open System, Selected Essays. London, Cameron May Ltd, 
2002, pp. 590-591. 
89  ICJ (1960). Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India) (emphasis added). 
90  ICJ (1960). Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India) (emphasis added). 
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not exist in 1960, and has not been established ever since, which might have contributed to the 
Court’s conclusion91. More importantly, the ICJ emphasised that the situation in the Right of 
Passage was a concrete one92. Exactly the same line of reasoning could be used to interpret the 
effects of the Asylum case, since the Court could not establish the existence of any general rule 
related to granting of the diplomatic asylum back in the 1950s. Therefore, lex specialis rule could 
not apply, as there has been no lex generalis in either case. This brief analysis might imply that 
the Court actually avoided declaring on the prevalence of a certain type of custom in the 
theoretical situation when clashing general and special customary rules cover the same matter. 
Therefore, this issue shall remain unresolved in practice until the Court faces this problem. 
ILC is of the view that lex specialis rule can be used with regards to customary law93. What is 
more, its report indicates that special custom prevails over general customary IL94. 
Crawford’s view is not so straightforward. He explains that the ICJ “tends to see cases raising 
regional considerations through the prism of general IL”95. He also notes that “universalist” 
tendencies overruled regional considerations in Asylum case96. Also, Crawford understood 
Frontier Dispute case so as to reflect the tendency of the ICJ to accommodate originally “non-
universal” rules such as uti possidetis only if they “fit within the ordinary framework of IL” as 
reflected in the principle of intangibility of frontiers97. Right of Passage case and its message of 
prevalence of specific practice between two states over any general rule still may sit 
comfortably with the message of the Frontier Dispute case, since the Court refused to deal with 
the question of existence of a general rule in the former. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
91  D’Amato argues that ‘the primacy of special custom in this case was made possible largely by the absence of any 
convincing demonstration by Portugal of a general custom of military access to enclaves.’ D’AMATO, “The Concept of 
Special Custom…”, op.cit., p. 219. 
92  ICJ (1960). Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India). 
93  ILC (2006). Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law. However, the ILC noted that there are several instances in which the special 
rules should not prevail, citing the following examples: 1) when the nature of general law or the intention of the parties 
could point out to the prevalence of the general rule, 2) when the purpose of lex generalis is frustrated by lex specialis, 3) 
possible negative effects of the lex specialis to third-party beneficiaries of the rule and 4) when balance of the rights and 
duties, ‘established by general law may be negatively affected by special law’ (ibid., para.9). 
94  ILC (2006). Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising From the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report 
of the Study Group of International Law Commission, Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, A/CN.4/L.682. Interestingly, Konskenniemi 
does not seem to have such a clear-cut personal view on the relation between universal and local, as he appears to believe 
there is no given hierarchy between them. See: KOSKENNIEMI, Martti. “Hierarchy in International Law: A Sketch”. 
European Journal of International Law, 1997, 8, p. 577. 
95  CRAWFORD, Chance…, op. cit., p. 246. 
96  CRAWFORD, Chance…, op. cit., p. 247. 
97  CRAWFORD, Chance…, op. cit., p. 249. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
International custom is by far the most disputed source of IL. It seems that everything – from 
its existence to the type of evidence required for demonstrating its constitutive elements- is 
controversial. It is hardly arguable that the ICJ has sometimes gone further than just 
adjudicating when it was engaged with matters of customary IL, and has played a particularly 
important role in developing the rules of customary IL. To be fair, the development at times 
included introducing some confusion and inconsistency, especially when it came to the 
methodology Court has employed in order to establish customary rules. However, one of the 
most prominent contributions of the ICJ to such a development relates to the body of “non-
universal” rules of customary IL. Soon after its establishment, the ICJ took a proactive role 
and recognised the existence of “special” customary rules and perhaps creatively “read them” 
into Article 38(1) of the Statute. Moreover, the Court also seems to have created, by using 
inductive “bottom up” approach, the “rules on how to ascertain the rules” of special custom. 
Namely, it has set a higher threshold for proving the emergence of these norms through its 
case-law in Asylum, Fisheries, Nationals in Morocco and Right of Passage cases. Thus, the fulfilment 
of “standard” opinio juris and state practice requirements does not suffice for the establishment 
of a special custom. In addition, the ICJ also demands that the party which asserts that a 
special custom exists proves that the opposing party is bound by such a rule, while also 
demonstrating that such party has not explicitly or tacitly objected to the rule. However, the 
question remains whether the “top down” approach perhaps employed in Navigational and 
Related Rights is simply an anomaly in jurisprudence concerning special customs, or an indicator 
of nascent different approach of the Court in determining these rules. Even though the ICJ 
has generally had quite a proactive role with regards to special custom, it appears that it has 
failed to satisfactorily clarify what exactly is required to evidence opinio juris of such rule – 
evidence that a certain practice is “accepted as law” (as in Asylum or perhaps in Right of Passage 
cases) or “tolerance”/acquiescence as in Fisheries and Navigational and Related Rights. Also, the 
Court seems not to have resolved the issue of hierarchy between general and special customary 
rules (apart from the obvious case when jus cogens is involved), as Asylum and Right of Passage 
cases appear to send conflicting messages on the issue, which are also prone to multiple 
interpretations.   
 
 
